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Parental leave mandates are associated with high female employment rates, but with reductions in 
relative female wages if leave is of extended duration. We analyze the impact of family policies 
(parental leave and childcare prices) of Denmark and Sweden on women’s career breaks due to 
childbirth. These countries are culturally similar and share the same type of welfare state ideology, 
but differ remarkably in pursued family policies. Our analysis takes advantage of the availability 
of comparable longitudinal data and allows us to estimate parallel models across the two 
countries. The impact of family policies and economic incentives on the probability of returning 
to the labor market is estimated using a duration model approach. Our results show that 
economic incentives affect the behavior of mothers in both countries. However, the parental 
leave mandates as such are very important determinants for the observed behavior. Based on 
policy simulations we find that if fathers were given more parental leave, it would promote the 
labor supply of women.    
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Employment rates of mothers with young children have increased in almost all countries over the 
past thirty years. However, this trend has been accompanied by a large decrease in fertility in 
most countries (OECD, 2001). In contrast, the Nordic countries have not experienced such a 
strong trade-off between mothers’ employment and fertility. Both female employment and 
fertility rates have been high in an international perspective. Female employment rates for young 
women are close to 80% and fertility rates are only slightly lower than 2. Studies on female labor 
supply show that, contrary to most other countries where young children have a large negative 
impact on mothers’ labor supply, this effect is much smaller or non-existing in the Nordic 
countries (see Smith et al., 2003).  
 
The family policies in the Nordic countries have a long tradition in offering facilities and 
subsidies to encourage mothers to combine family and work. Many international comparative 
studies show that women appear to increase their attachment to the labor force when given the 
opportunity to take paid leave (see for example, Ruhm & Teague, 1997 Joesh, 1995; and 
Waldfogel et al., 1999). Thus, the positive effects to the labor market tend to outweigh the costs 
of conducting such parental leave and benefit policies and therefore they legitimize these family 
friendly polices (Joesh, 1995; Gustafsson et al., 1996; Rönsen & Sundström, 1996). Ruhm’s 
(1998) comprehensive comparative study on European countries, for example, finds that parental 
leave legislation raises the female employment-to-population rate by 3-4%, and even more for 
women of childbearing age. However, there may also be negative effects of very generous family-
friendly schemes if these schemes are mainly picked up by the mothers and not the fathers (see 
Nielsen et al., 2002, Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002). The schemes may reduce the human capital 
of the woman compared to men, and they may give rise to statistical discrimination effects, 
reduce women’s wage growth and increase the gender wage gap. However, in this paper we do 
not focus on these negative potential effects of family-friendly policies. 
 
The aim of this study is to examine the duration of career interruptions contingent to childbirth 
of Danish and Swedish women. Which factors affect a mother’s decision to return to work after 
childbirth? How important are the benefit compensation rate and the parental leave schemes? Do 
the prices and the availability of publicly provided childcare affect the retention decision? How 
do the availability and eligibility rules concerning fathers’ leave affect the length of the career 
break of the mothers?  
 
  2Our analysis takes advantage of the availability of comparable longitudinal data. These data allow 
us to estimate parallel models across the countries in order to determine to which extent the 
family-leave policies affect women’s retention. The study examines Danish and Swedish mothers 
who participate in the labor market and interrupt their careers due to childbirth during 1990s. 
Here we also make use of fathers’ characteristics and their uptake of parental leave. It is 
interesting to compare these two culturally similar countries which share the same pattern of 
employment of women overall and of women with young children in particular, but differ 
remarkably in their family policies. During the last decades, Sweden has implemented fairly long 
maternal and parental leave schemes compared to Denmark. On the other hand, the coverage of 
publicly provided and subsidized childcare for children aged less than 3 has been considerably 
higher in Denmark compared to Sweden (Ellingsäter, 1998). We test by simulations the impact of 
family policy regimes on the length of mothers’ career breaks. 
 
The raw data and the empirical estimations clearly show that women have a very high probability 
of returning to employment when the parental leave has expired (well over 90% do return). The 
rules of parental leave schemes as well as the other parts of the family policy regimes affect the 
mothers’ decision on job retention. The same seems to apply to men. When given explicitly the 
possibility for taking parental leave, the majority of fathers (about 70% of fathers in Sweden, and 
almost 50% of fathers in Denmark) make use of it. However, very few of the Danish fathers take 
more than two weeks of parental leave just after the childbirth. Our results clearly show that 
there is room for policy changes, which might promote both female labor supply and equal role 
sharing by both parents.    
 
The structure of the paper is the following. The next section shortly describes the family policies 
in Denmark and Sweden. Section 3 summarizes some of the recent international studies about 
the impact of family policies on mother’s employment. In Section 4, the econometric model is 
presented. The description of data and the descriptive statistics are presented in Section 5. 
Section 6 analyzes the results from the estimations and policy simulations, and Section 7 
concludes.    
 
2.   Earlier Studies of Labor Supply Effects of Family Policy Schemes 
According to many comparative studies, the impact of family policies on mothers’ (or fathers’) 
return to work can be quite substantial. A large literature provides insights on how different 
policies result in different labor force attachments of women. Waldfogel et al. (1999) compare 
  3mothers in the US, Britain and Japan and find that young children have a very strong negative 
effect on women’s employment. However, they find strong evidence that family leave coverage 
increases the likelihood that a woman will return to employment after childbirth in all three 
countries investigated. They conclude that the recent expansions in family leave coverage in these 
countries are likely to lead to increased employment of women after childbirth and in some cases 
even boost job retention. Ruhm (1998) investigates the economic consequences of paid parental 
leave in nine European countries and finds that a right to paid leave raises the employment rate 
of women. Even short durations of guaranteed work absence have a substantial effect on female 
employment. These results are confirmed for Germany in a study by Ondrich et al. (1999). 
 
A longer entitlement period, such as the Swedish one, tends to lengthen the time out of 
employment shortly after childbirth, but in the long run a longer leave period enables more 
parents (mothers) to join and stay in the labor force and therefore results in higher overall re-
entry rates. Rönsen & Sundström (1996) study the impact of family policies on the return to work 
by comparing the post birth employment activity of Norwegian and Swedish women. They 
analyze rates of re-entry into paid work after the first birth for mothers in 1968-1988. The most 
important findings are that the right to paid maternity leave with job-protection greatly speeds up 
the return to employment and that women who have this right are much more likely to resume 
employment. However, part of this effect may be due to the fact that those women, who are 
eligible for leave schemes, are also the women with a more permanent attachment to the labor 
market and the strongest preferences for market work. Extensions in leave schemes and the so-
called Swedish “speed-premium” on the next birth have, though, delayed the return to work.  
 
Gustafsson et al. (1996) analyze labor force transitions around childbirth and the extent to which 
lower labor force participation rates of mothers are explained by different family policies. They 
compare German, Swedish and British women and find that different welfare policy regimes 
produce different outcomes in labor force participation among mothers. These countries 
represent the three main types of different welfare states. The difference in total labor force 
participation of women is a result of fewer mothers entering the labor force and entering later 
after births in Germany and Great Britain than in Sweden. Although there is no such difference 
before the birth of the first child, the difference is more pronounced for second and third births. 
  
In the study by Gustafsson et al. (1996), it is found that women’s own human capital is important 
both in Germany and Great Britain, whereas in Sweden also less educated women have entered 
  4the labor force by the time the child is two years old. The same result is found in Klerman & 
Leibowitz (1990) and Joesh (1994). Family income has been reported to have either a negative or 
no relationship with the timing of post-birth employment (Wenk & Garrett, 1992). Results are 
more mixed for most other factors, such as education level, age at birth, marital status, and race 
(Desai & Waite, 1991; Wenk & Garret, 1992). For Sweden, Rönsen & Sundström (1996) found 
that more educated women have shorter career breaks contingent to childbirth compared to less 
educated women.    
 
A good deal of the literature has found that at least part of the wage gap between the sexes is the 
result of women having more frequent career interruptions (some of the early references are 
Mincer & Polachek, 1974; Gronau & Weiss, 1981). Forgone growth of human capital and the 
depreciation of human capital during lengthy leave periods cause wage setbacks for women. The 
wage gap can be a consequence of a direct or indirect discrimination, too. Entitlements that allow 
substantial time off work may cause employers to limit women to jobs where absences are least 
costly, thereby increasing occupational segregation, which has obviously occurred in Nordic 
countries (see Stoiber, 1990).   
 
Since the parental leave mandates and job-protection during the leave of absence tend to 
promote job retention, they may also promote a more rapid wage growth. If protected leave 
allowed women to return to a previous employer, as opposed to getting a new job or leaving the 
labor market entirely for a period, the leave policies would prevent women from loosing tenure 
and firm-specific human capital, and consequently promote wage growth through gains from 
good job matches and reduced depreciation of human capital during non-employment periods. 
Recent studies in the US and Britain provide evidence of positive wage effects of returning to the 
same employer after childbirth (see, for example, Waldfogel, 1997; Joshi et al., 1996). There is 
also some recent evidence on the positive wage effects of maternity leave coverage in the US and 
Britain (Waldfogel, 1998). However, this effect may to a large extent be a consequence of that the 
women covered by generous leave schemes are a selected group, who are able to get a job at 
firms with attractive working conditions and “fringe benefits” like maternal leave schemes. For 
countries like Sweden and Denmark, these selection effects are expected to be very small since 
the leave schemes are almost universal in both countries, and to a great extent publicly financed. 
A government mandate eliminates this type of sorting of workers. Thus, empirical studies from 
Sweden and Denmark have found very small long-run effects on subsequent earnings for 
mothers who entered formal maternity leave (see Albrecht et al., 1999;  Datta Gupta and Smith 
  5(2002). However, Datta Gupta & Smith compare the wage growth of women to that of men, and 
they find that when controlling for background characteristics, the wage increases of men are 
considerably larger during the child-bearing period compared with women, irrespective whether 
they are mothers or not. The explanation could be that since almost every mother makes use of 
the compensated parental leave she is entitled to, employers expect every woman, by default, to 
experience career interruptions, and thus even those women who actually do not get children face 
a lower wage growth, a type of statistical discrimination. Hence, the leave schemes may have 
negative long-run wage effects in countries with an almost 100% coverage, but they are not 
observed when comparing the wage development of mothers with non-mothers. This conclusion 
is consistent with Ruhm (1998) who finds that, based on time series from OECD countries, the 
gender wage gap tends to increase significantly when new leave schemes are introduced or the 
leave schemes are extended.  
 
There is less recent empirical research on the effects of child day care programs on parents’ 
(mothers’) work choices and families’ decisions about how to provide care for their children. 
Lack of formal and affordable good quality care may constrain mothers to take paid employment, 
see OECD (2001). The limited empirical evidence within this area is probably due to lack of data 
on availability, prices and type of childcare. A recent comprehensive study based on British data 
is found in Paull et al. (2002) and OECD (2002).  
 
3   Description of the Danish and Swedish Family Policies 
Although the Danish and Swedish family policies are much more developed compared to most 
other countries, there are large differences in the rules concerning parental leave programs as well 
as the coverage and price structure of childcare.
1  
 
3.1  Parental Leave Schemes 
On the whole, the Swedish parental leave schemes are highly flexible and fairly generous 
compared to the Danish schemes. The principal idea in the Swedish system is that parenthood is 
considered to be a shared responsibility between the mother and the father. Fathers are therefore 
particularly encouraged to take leave, which has resulted in a very recent policy reform providing 
a minimum of two months of ring-fenced leave for either parent that is not transferable to the 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we do not analyze the impact of the taxation scheme, i.e. whether joint, split or separate taxation 
on the labour supply of the fathers and mothers. In both countries, the tax schemes are based on the separate 
taxation principle, which is neutral with respect to the relative incentives to work for the spouses, see Smith et al. 
(2003). 
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Sweden, the leave schemes in Denmark have been rather inflexible in the sense that until recently 
it has not really been possible to split the leave period in several periods like in Sweden. There is 
much less focus on a shared responsibility of both parents. Thus the period of parental leave 
which can be taken by either parent is much shorter in Denmark than in Sweden, and a ring-
fenced leave for the father has only existed for a short period from1999 to 2002, except for two 
weeks in connection with childbirth. In both countries, the length of the leave period has been 
extended over the years. In Sweden, the compensation rate has been slightly reduced during the 
1990s, whereas in Denmark the tendency is mixed: for some schemes the compensation has 
increased, for others reduced. The rules are described in more detail below. 
 
Duration of the Leave Schemes 
Sweden has a universal parental leave and benefit coverage. All parents are entitled to the leave, 
regardless of whether they are participating in the labor force or not. Since 1994, parents have 
been entitled altogether to 450 days compensated leave per child. The leave can be taken flexibly 
from 60 days before the expected date of birth until the child is eight years old. Benefits can be 
used either full-time or part-time or saved and used any time within the entitlement period. The 
system allows both parents to share the leave and to interrupt the leave in order to save days for 
later use. Parents are entitled to have 360 days (each have 180 days) parental leave with a 
compensation level that is related to the income prior to the leave period, and in addition to that 
a father is permitted to take 10 extra days of leave in connection with childbirth. A parent is 
allowed to transfer his or her days of leave to the other parent, but 30 days are reserved for him 
or her only. If the other parent does not use these days, they are lost. In addition to that, parents 
are allowed to take an extra period of leave of 90 days with only a guarantee level of 
compensation, a flat rate which is € 6.7 per day.
2 So, the parental leave for each child amounts to 
450 days in total, which can be divided among the parents in a very flexible way. Single parents 
are entitled to 450 days as well. In the case of multiple births, parents are entitled to an additional 
180 days leave.  
 
Denmark has a slightly less universal system compared to Sweden (see, for instance, Rostgaard et 
al., 1999 for a more detailed description of the Danish leave schemes). Since 1985, mothers who 
have a regular income during the latest 13 weeks before the birth are entitled to a maternal leave 
of 4 weeks before the birth (8 weeks in some unions in the public sector) and 14 weeks after, plus 
                                                 
2 The guarantee level of compensation is SEK 60 (since 1987). The exchange rate used here is € 1 = SEK 8.6. 
  7a parental leave period of 10 weeks until 2002 when the parental leave was extended, see below). 
This parental leave can be taken either by the mother or the father, but the parents cannot be on 
leave at the same time. During these 10 weeks, a parent is only allowed to work a few hours 
weekly. If the parent chooses to work part-time, the benefit is reduced accordingly, and the “non-
used” period cannot be saved and used later as in Sweden. Further, a father is entitled to 2 weeks’ 
leave in connection to childbirth. During 1999-2002, the father was entitled to two extra weeks 
after the 10-week parental leave. These weeks were reserved for the father only and were lost if 
he did not use them. During the period 1992-2002, an additional ‘childcare leave scheme’ was 
available. The childcare leave scheme allowed both parents, whether employed or unemployed, to 
take leave for a period of up to 52 weeks for each child aged less than 9 years.
3 Most parents were 
entitled to the leave, irrespective of membership of unemployment insurance funds (UI-funds), 
employment etc. The scheme was changed several times and was abolished completely in 2002, 
when the parental leave period was extended from 10 to 32 weeks abolished in addition to the 14 
weeks of maternal leave just after childbirth. At the same time, the 2 weeks of ‘father quota’ leave 
was abolished.  
Compensation during the Leave Period 
Sweden: The level of compensation depends on prior earnings. If parents have not been employed 
a period before childbirth, they are eligible only for a guarantee level of benefits which amounts 
to € 6.7 per day (since 1987). If the parents were employed, they are entitled to an 80% 
replacement of their previous income up to an income ceiling. In some sectors (specified in 
collective agreements between unions and employers’ confederation), the public compensation 
may be supplemented by the employer to full-wage compensation. Further, there is a so-called 
“speed-premium” for mothers who intend to have another child soon after the previous child. A 
mother is guaranteed to have the same level of compensation without returning to employment if 
there is not more than 30 months in between the childbirths. The main purpose of this rule was 
to stimulate fertility among Swedish mothers.  
 
Denmark: The compensation during maternal leave depends on the sector of employment. In the 
public sector, there is full-wage compensation. For the privately employed, the compensation 
depends on collective agreements between the employers and the unions, and some of them have 
                                                 
3 Thus, more individuals are entitled to childcare leave than to parental leave schemes. Housewives without any 
regular income are the only group which is not entitled to childcare leave. However, this group constitutes less than 
5% of the population in the age groups concerned. The duration of the childcare leave period depends on the age of 
a child. If the child is less than 1 year, the entitled period is 26 weeks, and it might be extended to 52 weeks if the 
employer accepted this extension. If the child is older, the duration is shorter. 
  8specified a full pay during maternal and parental leave.
4 For those groups, which are not covered 
by these agreements, the compensation is calculated according to the rules of the unemployment 
insurance benefit system (UI-benefits). The compensation is 90% of previous earnings up to a 
maximum. On average, the compensation rate is 60-70% of former earnings. Since men on 
average tend to have higher earnings than women, and since more than half of the mothers are 
entitled to a full pay during parental leave, because they are employed in the public sector, most 
households have a strong economic incentive to let the mother use the parental leave period, 
which can be shared between the parents. The compensation during childcare leave was 
considerably lower than for the maternal and parental leave periods. Initially, the compensation 
rate was 100% of the UI-benefits but it has been reduced several times since 1994, and since 
1999 the compensation has been 60% of the UI-benefits. In 2002, when the childcare leave and 
parental leave schemes were combined into a one scheme, the compensation rate for this 
extended parental leave period is left to the same level as the former childcare leave, i.e. 60% of 
the UI-benefits.  
  
3.2   Childcare 
A major aspect of the effect of children on the earning capacity of parents is the access to as well 
as the quality and prices of day care facilities. If it was easy and relatively cheap to get childcare, 
the earnings capacity of the parents (mothers) might well be less “damaged” than in countries 
where childcare facilities are scarce or expensive. Furthermore, if the quality or stability of the 
childcare arrangements is low, it may induce higher absenteeism from work and lower the 
productivity of the parents (mothers), compared to countries with high coverage along with high 
quality and stable childcare. In Sweden and Denmark, the coverage of publicly provided childcare 
for children aged below 3 years has increased considerably during the last decades (see OECD, 
2001). Despite the large expansion, there is a constant shortage of child day care places in both 
Sweden and Denmark. One major reason is that public day care is highly subsidized, i.e. the price 
is much lower than the actual price of producing these services. The quality is fairly high in an 
international setting when measured by the staffing and economic resources spent on public 
childcare (see Rostgaard & Fridberg, 1998; Waldfogel, 1998, for international surveys of childcare 
systems).  
 
                                                 
4 An increasing number of workers in the private sector are entitled to a full compensation of former earnings. 
Collective agreements between unions and employers specify that the employers are due to supplement the public 
benefits. In 2002, all women have a full pay during maternal leave. 
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programs: day care centers, family day care and after school homes. Beside the public services, 
there also exist private childcare services (some of them are publicly supported), but the amount 
of private services is considerably less than in other non-Nordic countries. The public childcare 
system is universal and is based primarily on children’s needs, and therefore it is very common 
for children to attend publicly provided childcare even though the parents are not working.  
 
Sweden:  In autumn 2000, 76% of children aged 1-5, 67% children aged 6-9 and about 7% of 
children aged 10-12 attended public childcare (Socialdepartementet, 2001). According to a survey, 
only about 3% of 1-5 year-old children were in private childcare (Skolverket, 2002). Day care fees 
have increased especially during the 1990s because of the dampening economic situation in 
municipalities and in order to suppress the demand. The fees contributed to 18 % of the total 
costs in 1999. The payment scheme varies across municipalities although most often the payment 
is related to the number of children, time used and parents’ income. While the time-based fees 
provide parents with greater opportunities to influence the costs of childcare, they can also cause 
large marginal effects when a parent increases hours of work, especially for single parents. On 
average, the cost for a two-earner household with two children is € 230 (ranging from € 0 to 467). 
A completely new payment scheme was introduced in 2002, which is called ‘maxtaxa’ referring to 
a payment ceiling (for a respective family the cost will be at maximum € 210).  
 
Denmark: About 92% of all children aged 3-5, and more than half of the children aged 0-2 years 
attended publicly provided childcare in 1999. As in Sweden, the demand for public childcare is 
strongly stimulated by large price subsidies to childcare. According to the governmental 
regulations, parents are not allowed to pay more than 30% of the variable costs of the day care 
place for pre-school children aged less than 7, i.e. the local governments stand for at least 70% of 
the variable cost and additionally all fixed costs. In many municipalities, the subsidies are even 
larger. Further, there is an additional means-tested subsidy for low-income households. The 
monthly costs of a childcare place vary between municipalities. The typical monthly cost for a 0-2 
year-old child ranges from € 250 to € 300, while for older children the prices are lower. As in 
Sweden, expenditure on publicly (or privately) provided childcare is not deducible from taxable 
income. 
 
Despite the high coverage of publicly provided childcare in both countries, there is an excess 
demand for childcare places in many municipalities. There are more or less formal queuing 
  10systems in many municipalities implying that parents either have to extend their leave of absence 
or use private childcare. There is no systematic information on queues to public childcare. 
Furthermore, a small market for untaxed private childcare exists, but there is fairly little 
information on the amount and prices of privately provided childcare. One reason that private 
childcare is seldomly used and there is a lack of exact information is that private childcare is 
almost always untaxed and part of the underground sector because of the high levels of VAT and 
income taxes in Denmark and Sweden. If private childcare was produced in the formal (taxed) 
sector and without subsidies, the prices would be extremely high compared to publicly provided 
care. However, parents also seem to prefer public day care for quality reasons.   
 
3.3   Other Family Policy Regulations 
The law guarantees a job security which entails the same or a comparable position upon the 
parent’s return from leave. In both countries, it is illegal to fire a parent on parental leave. In 
Sweden, there is a job protection period of 18 months for parents of a newborn, and furthermore 
parents are legally entitled to work shorter hours until the eighth birthday of the child, with a 
corresponding reduction in wages, in both the public and private sectors. In Denmark, this is 
only the case for publicly employed parents.  
 
In both countries, a scheme for care days exists. In Denmark, the publicly employed have a right 
to 10 care days annually with full pay, which can be used if the child is ill, for visits at the doctor 
etc. Since 1998, some groups in the private sector have also got the right to care days (14 days 
with full pay). In Sweden, there is a parallel care day scheme. A parent has a right to 60 days of 
care annually if the child is ill up to the 12
th birthday of the child.  
 
Finally, in both countries the option of part-time work has been available for most women. The 
part-time frequency has been high in both countries, but in the latest decades it has dropped 
considerably in Denmark, but not in Sweden. In 1983, 43% of all Danish employed women were 
part-time employed while in 2000 the frequency was only 17%. Women with young children tend 
work longer hours than women without children, see Smith (1998). In Sweden, 46% of the 
Swedish mothers and about 6% of the Swedish fathers of young children worked part-time (SCB, 
2001) in 1998.   
 
  114   Model  
Our intention is to estimate parallel models of the effects of different family policies on job 
retention of Danish and Swedish mothers, controlling for other individual and family 
characteristics that are likely to affect retention. In deriving a model that describes the decision to 
re-enter the labor market after childbirth, we assume that the fertility decision has already been 
made and the decision whether to resume employment depends on the expected utility over the 
lifecycle at each point of time. A formal theoretical model based on this approach is found in 
Ondrich et al. (1998, 1999).  
 
Based on an inter-temporal plan, the timing of job retention may be described by a model where 
the mother in each period evaluates her expected utility of returning to work (VW (t)) with her 
expected utility of staying at home (VM (t)) for one more period.  The expected utility from 
returning to work includes the wage effects from human capital depreciation, forgone training 
and the potential wage effects of loosing the current job, and thus probably loosing a firm 
specific human capital. The expected utility from staying at home one more period depends on 
individual preferences, family situation (e.g. the existence of other children) and the rate of 
compensation while on leave. The model by Ondrich et al. does not explicitly include prices and 
availability of alternatives to a mother’s time with respect to care for the child, i.e. public or 
private childcare, and the price and availability of the father’s time, but these variables may be 
added to the model. The presence of a newborn is likely to increase VM strongly within the first 
months or years, but as children grow they become less time intensive (but more goods 
intensive), and thus the utility of staying at home one more period is likely to fall. The mother 
will return to work at the first t for which VW (t) > VM (t). Ondrich et al. show that the probability 
of returning to work in a given period is a negative function of the time until the leave period 
expires and the compensation rate.  
 
In analyzing the return to work after the childbirth, we use a continuous time duration model. A 
set of parameters is used to generate probabilities of events occurring in intervals of different 
lengths. The intention is to consider the impact of family policies (duration of and compensation 
in maternal and parental leave, prices and availability of childcare) on job retention, controlling 
for other aspects that might affect their preferences, such as education, age, marital status and 
having other young children. The career break due to childbirth is measured as a period on 
compensated parental leave, calculated as full-day equivalents and measured in weeks on parental 
leave. The probability of ending a career break and resuming employment is estimated using a 
  12Cox proportional hazard model of the duration of parental leave. The advantage of this method 
is that it does not require any a priori assumption about the probability distribution to represent 
survival times.  
 
The model is written as 
 
hi (t;X) = λ0(t) exp [ X(t) β  ]          ( 1 )  
 
where hi (t;X) represents the hazard for individual i at time t,  λ0(t) is the baseline hazard function 
that is left unspecified, i.e. we use a semi-parametric approach, and X(t)  represents a vector of 
time invariant and time-varying covariates and β is a vector of parameters.
5
 
A principal drawback when applying the basic Cox proportional hazard model is that it assumes 
for any two individuals that the ratio of the hazards is constant over time. However, there are 
various ways to test whether this proportionality assumption holds, for example, with the 
Schoenfeld residuals method, that is used here. Another drawback with the model is that it does 
not account for unobserved heterogeneity. Individuals usually differ in ways that are not fully 
captured by the model. As pointed out in numerous studies, estimation of hazard models that do 
not control for unobserved heterogeneity may result in biased estimates of the parameters 
(Heckman & Singer, 1985). For example, individuals with unobserved characteristics in the form 
of preferences for market work and career ambitions, will probably return to work before 
individuals who are less committed to work. Thus, the observed probability of returning to work, 
conditional of not having returned yet, i.e. the hazard, will tend to decline with the length of the 
spell simply because of a sorting effect where more and more individuals with unobserved 
characteristics for non-work will dominate the group of individuals still on leave. On the other 
hand, along the lines of the human capital theory the heterogeneity with respect to the preference 
for work is at least partly observable. Differences in human capital endowments are reflected in 
differences in the level of education and in labor market experience. Therefore, we could expect 
to capture the group of women with a higher preference for work by controlling for these 
                                                 
5 Since the option of part-time work may play an important role for the decision to return to the labor market, it 
would have been interesting to see whether mothers end up to a part-time or full-time employment after the parental 
leave spell by estimating a competing risks model, which allows us to estimate destination-specific hazard functions. 
Unfortunately, the information in our data sources on part- and full-time states after childbirth is incomplete, and 
therefore we are not able to apply a competing risks approach. 
 
  13observable characteristics if schooling attainment is a function of ability and motivation and other 
unobserved characteristics, see Figure 1 below.   
 
5  Data and Descriptive Statistics  
The Swedish Data 
To study career interruptions due to parental leave, we use register data containing information 
on parental leave periods of all parents and compensation levels, conducted by the National 
Insurance Board, Sweden. These data are the supplement to the large longitudinal LINDA 
database
6 which has register-based information on income and taxes with a rich array of 
individual and family characteristics. The LINDA data are representative data on the Swedish 
population and contain information on about 300,000 households annually. Due to the panel 
property of the data, we are able to follow individuals from the year 1992 up to 2000. In total, 
there are 20,573 observations (childbirths) in the Swedish sample. Since some women experience 
more childbirths during the observation period, the same mother may have more birth records in 
the sample. 
 
The parental leave data contain information on all children and their parents who have taken 
parental leave during the child’s first eight years. The data have records on periods when taking 
leave, level of compensation, number of days with compensation and rate of compensation. 
These data cover the years 1993-2001 (June). The key variables of the study are collected from 
both the basic LINDA database and the supplementary data basis. Since the idea is to study the 
length of the career break, we focus only on the mothers who were employed, self-employed or 
unemployed prior to childbirth. In order to be able to follow mothers at least 15 months after 
childbirth, the birth cohorts considered are 1993-1998. The records for mothers’ and fathers’ 
characteristics are collected from a year before and the information about the re-entry to the 
labor market from a year after the parental leave spell. We only include birth observations where 
we have observations on both fathers and mothers.    
 
In Sweden, mothers can take parental leave with a 25, 50, 75 or 100% compensation rate. 
Parental leave periods are then converted as full-day equivalents. Nevertheless, the majority 
(92%) of all mothers take the leave with a 100% cover. Mothers are followed until they resume 
work or stop their parental leave schemes. A career break, the dependent variable, is counted as 
                                                 
6 Longitudinal Individual Data (LINDA) is a joint endeavor between the Department of Economics at Uppsala 
University, The National Insurance Board (RFV), Statistics Sweden and the Ministries of Finance and Labor. The 
data have been collected systematically since 1960. 
  14the time in weeks between the first day of the parental leave period and the last one during the 
first fifteen months after the childbirth. Even though the majority of the mothers take their 
period of leave very concentrated right after the birth, some women choose to return to 
employment before their maternity leave has expired.  
 
The Danish Data 
The Danish sample is selected from the Danish Longitudinal Panel Database which is a random 
register-based sample selected by Statistics Denmark.
7 The sample is a representative panel 
sample, which covers each of the years 1976-1997 for about 300,000 individuals (5% of the 
Danish adult population). For this study, we have selected all women in the master sample who 
gave birth to at least one child during the period 1993-1996 and who were labor market 
participants prior to childbirth. For these women, additional register information from “The 
integrated Social Statistics” owned by Statistics Denmark is merged to the master sample. The 
register includes weekly or monthly information on all types of public income transfers and 
weekly information on participation in different leave schemes. The first year included in this 
register was 1993, and at the time of selecting the sample, the last available year was 1997. 
Therefore, we restrict the selected sample to children born during the period 1993-1996 in order 
to reduce the number of right-censored observations. We include a small number of children 
where we only observe the mother but not the father. However, in the estimations only 
observations where both parents are observed are included. In total, there are 9,378 observations 
(childbirths) in the Danish sample. 
 
Based on the information from the “The integrated Social Statistics”, we construct spells of 
career breaks related to each childbirth. A spell is defined as an unbroken period out of the labor 
market, either in maternal leave, parental leave or childcare leave, or out of job without being in 
any scheme. The spell ends when the woman starts to work.  
 
From the registers in Statistics Denmark, we get additional information on the fathers of the 
children who are born in the master sample during 1993-1996. Thus, we are able to construct 
household information by combining the additional information on fathers with the sample of 
mothers. The background information is collected during the years 1992-1996 since a number of 
the explanatory variables are defined by their value during the year prior to birth.   
 
                                                 
7 Documentation of the 5% sample is found on www.cls.dk. 
  15The Danish and Swedish mothers are classified into three different samples according to the 
order of the child. The first sample consists of mothers who give birth to their first child, the 
second sample contains the mothers who are having their second child and the third sample 
contains the higher order births. The adopted children and multiple births are excluded. Further, 
we only choose mothers who have a partner, either married or cohabiting with her.  
 
Due to the differences in the constructions of the data, the Danish and Swedish observations 
(events) are collected in different ways. In both samples, we avoid left censoring by conditioning 
on parents who get a baby within the observation period. In the Swedish case, mothers are 
followed about fifteen months after the childbirth or until they re-enter the labor market if it 
happens before. Right censoring occurs after the observation period if the mother has not 
returned to the labor market, which is the case if she has a new period of parental leave, starts 
studying or stays at home caring the child. In the Danish case, the sample is selected from a 
random sample of mothers who had a child during the period 1993-1996. These women are 
observed weekly during the period. A spell is right censored if the woman is still on maternal, 
parental or childcare leave at the end of the observation period, i.e. ultimo 1997. 
 
Table 1 shows the sample means of parental leave durations for mothers and fathers in Denmark 
and Sweden, distributed by birth order. On average the leave period of Swedish mothers was 
about 10 weeks longer than the period of Danish mothers. The average leave period for the first 
child was about 40 weeks in Sweden and 30 weeks in Denmark, while the maternal leave period 
tends to increase slightly in both countries, the more children the mother already has. A Swedish 
father on average had a leave period of 4 weeks during the period 1993-1998 while Danish men 
spend much less time on paternal leave, only about 1.3 weeks per child. This partly reflects that a 
larger proportion of Danish men (about 40%) do not at all take-up any leave when they become 
fathers. For Sweden, this figure is only about 27%. 
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Table 1. The mean duration of parental leave periods of mothers and fathers in weeks and the share of 
fathers taking parental leave. 
 
SWEDEN 1) 
Observation period 1993-98 
First Child 
 
Second Child Higher 
order 
Parental leave taken by a mother 
(duration in weeks) 
40.2 42.5 43.1 
Parental leave taken by a father 
(duration in weeks) 
4.4 3.8 4.0 
Percentage of fathers who takes a 
leave period 
77 %  69 %  72 % 
     
 
DENMARK 
Observation period 1993-96 
First Child 
 
Second Child Higher 
order 
Parental leave taken by a mother 
(duration in weeks) 
30.6 31.4 32.5 
Parental leave taken by a father 
(duration in weeks) 
1.3 1.3 1.2 
Percentage of fathers who takes a 
leave period 
59% 59  % 58% 
     
1) For Sweden, the observation period is restricted to the first 15 months after childbirth. 
 
 
Table 1 only shows average figures on leave periods. There is a large variation between women 
with respect to the length of their maternal leave. Figures 1-2 show the sample frequencies of 
weeks on parental leave for all mothers and fathers in the Swedish and Danish samples. In Figure 
1, we have split the samples into women with and without a higher education, since there is a 
tendency that those with a higher education have considerably shorter maternal leave periods, 
especially in Sweden according to Figure 1. Further, it is also observed from the ‘raw survival 
curves’ in Figure 1, that the Danish women to a much larger extent than the Swedish women 
tend to return to work after a leave period of 25-28 weeks (6-7 months) while the much more 
smoothed Swedish curve indicates a larger variation of the length of leave periods for Swedish 
women, with a peak at 9-10 months. This may reflect the much more flexible Swedish leave 
schemes which allow mothers to return to work before the leave period expires, without loosing 
the right to use the rest of the leave period at a later point in time. The fathers’ leave periods, 
measured in weeks in Figure 2, also show large differences between Sweden and Denmark. 
Apparently, there are two types of Danish men, those who take up 2 weeks and those who do 
not take-up any weeks on paternal leave. Then there is a very small group of Danish men who 
take-up more than 2 weeks. The distribution of Swedish men is much more smoothed, and a 
much larger proportion than Danish men have fairly long paternal leave periods, i.e. more than 2 
weeks.         
 
  17Figure 1.  Survival curve of the career break of mothers. Comparison between the highly educated mothers 
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Figure 2.  Duration of parental leave of mothers (the upper panels) and fathers (the lower panels). 
 




































































One of the key explanatory policy variables in the estimated model in Section 6 is the 
compensation rate during the leave period. As described above, the rate of compensation is not 
constant during the mandated leave in either of the countries but decreases stepwise. Based on 
the register information on hourly wages, duration and timing of leave periods and 
supplementary information on the compensation rules, we are able to construct for each 
individual a time-varying variable representing the compensation rate that she receives during the 
leave of absence. The compensation rate is defined as the hourly compensation divided by the 
  19hourly market wage that the woman had prior to the leave period. The compensation rate is only 
calculated for the fathers and mothers where we have observations on their wage income. In 
Figure 3, we show the average compensation rate during the leave period, i.e. a weighted average 
of the compensation rate for men and women in the two countries. Most Swedish women receive 
a compensation rate around 80-90%. For Danish women, the variation much larger, with about 
half the women receiving full pay (public employed) while the rest have much lower 
compensation rates than in Sweden. The same pattern is observed for fathers in the two 
countries, but in both countries the fathers tend to have lower compensation rates than mothers. 
 
Figure 3. Compensation rates during the leave period for women (upper panels) and men (lower panels). 
Sweden (n=21018) and Denmark (mothers=8117, fathers=6549). 



































































  20A second policy variable which may explain the length of the leave period of the mother is the 
length of the father’s leave period. For Sweden, we use the length of the parental leave period 
that is targeted to fathers. During the observation period, 1993-1998, the Swedish father quota 
was extended, and this variation allows us to use this variable as a covariate. For the Danish 
sample, we use the length of a parental leave the father actually took, because there was no 
variation in the Danish paternal leave period during the observation period. The actual take-up of 
parental leave may be endogenous in the model, because the duration of both parents’ spells may 
be determined in a simultaneous process. The actual duration of fathers’ leave periods might be 
instrumented or the duration of both parents’ spells might be modeled in a simultaneous 
structure, but we do not have access to valid instruments in the sample, and therefore we prefer 
to use observed weeks of the father. This, of course, implies that our results may overstate the 
substitution effects between the parents, and that the causality may run both ways.  
 
Additional information on the local prices of publicly provided childcare is included in the 
sample. We include information on prices in 1993 in each of the 273 Danish municipalities and in 
about 150 Swedish regional areas, see Figure 4, which shows the sample distribution of monthly 
prices of publicly provided childcare for children aged 0-2 years.
8 As seen from Figure 4, there is 
a large variation in childcare prices, with a higher average level in Sweden compared to Denmark. 
However, compared to many other countries outside Scandinavia, the prices are fairly low. In 
order to control for the rationing of the public childcare, we also add an indicator variable for 
those municipalities where the availability of public childcare is limited.  
 
Other control variables (time-constant) are collected from the LINDA data (Sweden) and the 5% 
sample (Denmark) a year prior to childbirth. These are age, level of education, years of labor 
market experience, sector of employment, employment status, marital status, total income of a 
household and the number and ages of other children. We have the respective information about 
fathers, too.  
                                                 
8 There are about 238 municipalities in Sweden, but the information of prices is aggregated to regional prices. For 
Denmark, we use prices at municipal level. For each child in the sample, we assign the monthly price of childcare in 
the concerned area (municipality or for Sweden a larger area), whether or not the child is in publicly provided 
childcare after the leave period of the parents.   
  21Figure 4. Monthly childcare prices.  Sweden (n=21018) and Denmark (n=8117). 
 




































The labor market status before childbirth will possibly affect the timing of the labor market re-entry. 
For women without a permanent job, the employment status during pregnancy might be highly 
relevant. Thus, we include an indicator variable for whether a woman was unemployed before the 
childbirth. We also control for a sector of occupation prior to birth. The sector of occupation is: 
State, municipality, private employer or unemployed. The hypothesis is that those employed in 
the public sector might return to work earlier due to wider opportunities of combining work and 
parenthood (more flexible work schemes, e.g. part-time work).  
 
The timing of paid work is hypothesized to depend on a woman’s opportunity cost of working 
for pay relative to her opportunity cost of staying home. The opportunity cost of staying home 
depends on a set of human capital variables. Those who have a higher opportunity cost will be 
expected to return to work sooner. In view of that, the age at childbirth has a negative effect on 
job-retention since younger women have longer future work horizons and therefore would lose 
more from a career interruption. Also, women who have invested more in human capital, having 
higher education and more work experience may have more to lose when staying out of the 
employment. On the other hand, more education may also raise the reservation wage of a 
mother. To capture these effects, we use age, attained level of education and years of work 
experience as covariates. The level of education is defined by four categories: primary school, 
high-school or vocational school, short university degree and long university degree. The lowest 
level of education is used as a reference group in the estimations.  
 
  22The family situation plays an important role in women’s employment decisions. The age of other 
children seems relevant to the timing of women’s work decisions in addition to the number of 
children.  To address these effects, we use categorical variables for other 0-2 and 3-6 year-old 
children. Also an indicator variable for marital status is used. Further, the economic situation of a 
family may play an important role in the timing of women’s employment after childbirth. To 
capture this effect, we use family income as a covariate.  
 
To control for the macro economic trends during the period of interest, the yearly national 
unemployment rate is used as a covariate. Higher unemployment rates are expected to lengthen 
the time out of work. All the monetary values are expressed in Euros in 2000 prices. In 
Appendix, Tables A1-A3 summarize the descriptive statistics for each of the three sub-samples, 
i.e. 1
st birth observations, 2
nd birth observations and 3
rd or more births observations.  
 
6   Results and Policy Simulations 
The results from the proportional hazard model of the duration of parental leave are presented in 
Tables 2-3 for the Swedish and Danish samples, respectively. Based on the estimated hazard 
function, we simulate the effects of different policy changes. These simulation results are 
presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
 
6.1  Estimation of the Hazard Function 
Despite the considerable variation in the observed behavior of mothers in the two countries, the 
estimations in Tables 2 and 3 reveal large similarities with respect to the sign and size of 
estimated coefficients of the hazard functions for returning to work. A higher compensation rate 
significantly tends to lengthen the career break for both Danish (except 3 or more childbirths) 
and Swedish mothers, which is in accordance with a priori expectations. The length of the 
father’s leave period reduces the leave period of the mother significantly. The effect is only 
insignificant for Danish fathers having their third child. However, it should be kept in mind, that 
the definition of this variable is measured differently for Sweden and Denmark, and for Denmark 
there may be simultaneity problems which may imply that the numerical size of the estimated 
effect is overstated. The estimation results indicate that for one week’s increase in the fathers’ 
quota, the hazard of job retention goes up about 4% for Sweden and 6-7% for Denmark. 
However, the latter figure may be overstated because of the simultaneity problems mentioned 
above.  
 
  23Table 2. Sweden: The results from the estimations of the proportional hazard model of re-entering the labor 








































Family policy regimes: 
 
      
     Compensation rate   - 0.638 *** 
(0.197) 
0.528  - 0.235 * 
(0.103)     
0.790  - 0.343 ** 
(0.113)     
0.710 




1.037 0.040  *** 
(0.007) 
1.041 0.045  *** 
(0.008) 
1.046 




1.024  - 0.113 ** 
(0.043) 
0.893 -  0.076 
(0.049) 
0.927 




0.599  - 2.578 *** 
(0.490) 
0.076  - 1.650 ** 
(0.565) 
0.192 




1.162 1.053  *** 
(0.206) 
2.865 0.688  ** 
(0.237) 
1.989 
        
Labor market status 
 
      




1.219 0.192  *** 
(0.039) 
1.212 0.352  *** 
(0.052) 
1.422 




1.046 0.116  *** 
(0.029) 
1.123 
     Unemp. prior to birth 
 
- 0.371 *** 
(0.113) 
0.690  - 0.182 *** 
(0.042) 
0.833  - 0.208 *** 
(0.049) 
0.813 
        
Human capital variables: 
 
      
     Age   - 0.010 
(0.010) 
0.990 -  0.010 
(0.005) 
0.990  - 0.029 *** 
(0.005) 
0.984 
     Educ: High-school   0.169 
(0.114) 
1.184 0.133  ** 
(0.047) 
1.143 0.168  *** 
(0.042) 
1.112 




1.507 0.334  *** 
(0.053) 
1.397 0.442  *** 
(0.051) 
1.411 
     Educ: Long university 
      
0.701 *** 
(0.126) 
2.016 0.570  *** 
(0.059) 
1.768 0.651  *** 
(0.055) 
1.752 
     Years of work exp.  0.072 
(0.017) 
1.074 0.056  *** 
(0.009) 
1.057 0.063  *** 
(0.010) 
1.053 
    Yrs. Of work exp^2/100  - 0.240 
(0.095) 
0.787  - 0.159 ** 
(0.051) 
0.853  - 0.139 ** 
(0.057) 
0.881 
        
Family situation: 
 
      
     Marital status: married 
      
- 0.170 
(0.102) 
0.844 -  0.013 
(0.024) 
0.987 -  0.028 
(0.031) 
0.972 






1.001   - 0.005 
(0.004) 
0.995 
     Other child: 0-2 yrs. old  - - - -  - - - -   0.333 *** 
(0.043) 
1.395 0.081  * 
(0.038) 
1.085 





        
Macro economic variables: 
 
      
     Unemployment rate 
 
- 0.073 ** 
(0.027) 
0.930  - 0.042 ** 
(0.014) 
0.959  - 0.067 *** 
(0.017) 
0.936 
Number of observations  3300    9756    7517   
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Table 3. Denmark: The results from the estimations of the proportional hazard model of re-entering the 








































Family policy regimes: 
 
      
     Compensation rate   - 0.595 *** 
(0.121) 
0.551  - 0.599 *** 
(0.139)     
0.549  - 0.071  
(0.213)     
0.931 




1.054 0.062  *** 
(0.013) 
1.064 0.026   
(0.017) 
1.027 




1.033  - 0.031  
(0.104) 
0.969 -  0.183 
(0.182) 
0.833 




0.773  - 1.282  
(2.063) 
0.278  - 0.483  
(4.786) 
0.617 




1.156 0.597   
(0.951) 
1.817 0.188   
(2.227) 
1.207 
        
Labor market status 
 
      




1.262 0.129   
(0.097) 
1.138 0.260   
(0.164) 
1.297 
     Sector of occ.: municip.     0.066  
(0.049) 
1.068       - 0.058 
(0.052) 
0.943 -  0.040 
(0.084) 
0.960 
     Unemp. prior to birth 
 
 0.261 *** 
(0.051) 
1.298 0.208  *** 
(0.060) 
1.231  0.242 *  
(0.098) 
1.274 
        
Human capital variables: 
 
      




1.006  - 0.012  
(0.012) 
0.988 
     Educ: High-school   0.266 *** 
(0.054) 
1.305 0.105   
(0.056) 
1.111 0.008   
(0.086) 
1.008 




1.446 0.199  ** 
(0.067) 
1.221 0.262  ** 
(0.098) 
1.300 
     Educ: Long university 
      
0.634 *** 
(0.112) 
1.886 0.390  ** 
(0.120) 
1.477 0.231   
(0.185) 
1.260 




1.008  - 0.018  
(0.027) 
0.982 
     Yrs. of work exp^2/100  - 0.331** 
(0.113) 
0.718  - 0.017  
(0.102) 
0.983 0.317  * 
(0.130) 
1.372 
        
Family situation: 
 
      
     Marital status: married 








     Family inc (€ 10 000) 
 




1.015   0.004 
(0.013) 
1.004 
     Other child: 0-2 yrs. old  - - - -  - - - -   - 0.007  
(0.076) 
0.993 0.005   
(0.070) 
1.005 
     Other child: 3-6 yrs. old  - - - -  - - - -  0.008  
(0.075) 
1.008  - 0.058  
(0.079) 
0.944 
        
Macro economic variables: 
 
      




1.208 0.178  *** 
(0.015) 
1.195 0.170  *** 
(0.024) 
1.185 
Number of observations  3675    3172    1270   
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Day care prices also show an expected sign for the second and higher order births, but the effect 
is only significant for the second birth sample in Sweden. The effect is not significantly different 
from zero for the other samples, which is not surprising since the prices of childcare are relatively 
low and queuing systems may dominate price effects. The effect of childcare prices is negative 
only if the availability is good (the interaction term shows a positive sign). This can be seen in the 
estimate of the availability of public childcare which is more important to the job retention 
decision for the third sample than the price. It may well be the case that many mothers have to 
postpone the job retention due to queuing. The availability of all types of childcare is meager in 
big cities, not only the publicly provided childcare but also the availability of informal care. 
Informal sources of care, such as that provided by grandparents, friends and neighbors in a non-
market setting, may be more difficult to get if a family does not live near these informal networks.  
 
The second set of the variables controls for the characteristics considering the labor market status. 
The sector of employment seems to affect the retention decision in both countries. Women 
employed in the public (state and municipality) sector in Sweden and the state sector in Denmark 
tend to return earlier to work (when controlling for the higher compensation rate in the public 
sector in Denmark) compared with the private sector employed (the reference group). This may 
reflect a more tolerant and supportive attitude from the employer’s side towards parenthood, 
mothers return sooner but are allowed more flexibly to take time off work when needed (see 
Nielsen et al., 2002). In the private sector, there is not necessarily such a family-adjusted 
flexibility. Further, the employment status prior to childbirth affects the decision to return to the 
labor market. For the Swedish sample, we see that mothers who were unemployed prior to 
childbirth have longer periods of leave, which is quite intuitive. For Denmark we get the opposite 
result; mothers who were unemployed prior to childbirth tend to return earlier to their job. We 
have no good explanation of this result, except that it may reflect the very large changes in the 
Danish labor market in the period 1993-1996 which was dominated by a strong cyclical upturn 
and some major labor market reforms which, among others, implied much more tight rules 
concerning availability for the labor market for unemployed people.  
 
The human capital variables capture the effect of education, age and years of labor market experience 
on the risk to return to work. The raw data shown earlier in Figure 1 and the results from the 
hazard models confirm that the level of education has a very strong and pronounced effect on 
women’s decision to return to work. The higher the attained degree of schooling, the shorter the 
career break. The effect is significant in most of all three samples. The reference level in the 
  26estimations is compulsory school, and compared to that, for all three higher categories the effect 
is positive, indicating a higher risk to return. For example, for the Swedish samples the hazard for 
employment is estimated to be almost 2 times higher for women having a long university degree 
than for women having the lowest level of education. For the Danish samples, the effect is also 
strong, especially for the 1
st child sample, while for the third or more childbirth the educational 
effect seems to be lower than for the first two childbirths. The education variable is likely to pick 
up some of the differences in foregone earnings since wages are not included in the model.  
 
The age mother’s age on return from leave has a significant effect only for the sample of 3
rd 
or higher order births in Sweden. For them, the effect is negative on job retention, though the 
effect is minimal, for each one-year increase in age at childbirth the hazard of return goes 
down by 1.6%. The number of years of labor market experience reflects the attachment to the 
labor market prior to childbirth. This variable and its square are significant for 2 childbirths or 
more in Sweden. The more work experience the mother has, the shorter the career break but 
with a decreasing rate. For Denmark, the effect is estimated to have an increasing rate for women 
having their 3rd child or more. However, the numerical size of the age effect is small. 
 
The model has control variables for the family situation of a mother. The marital status, an indicator 
for being married, may reflect traditional values or a more stable family concept. However, the 
variables turn out to be insignificant in both countries.  For the Swedish samples, the existence of 
other children shortens the career break, whereas the effect is reversed for the Danish samples. 
Apparently, the availability of childcare is part of the cause. In Sweden, it is easier to get a day 
care place if there are other siblings who already have a place in day care. We do not see this 
effect for Denmark where the sibling variables are insignificant.   
 
In order to include the effect of the macro economic situation, the national unemployment rate is 
added as a covariate to the model. For the Swedish samples, the effect is clearly negative, 
indicating longer career interruptions for mothers, while the effect is the opposite for the Danish 
sample. One explanation of the difference between Sweden and Denmark with respect to this 
result may be the cyclical effects and labor market reforms mentioned above. An additional 
explanation might be the differences in job-protection laws in the two countries. When the 
unemployment rate is high, mothers with a job might want to return sooner if they fear for 
loosing the job. However, if there is a job-protection, this may not be a problem, at least in 
principle.   
  27 
6.2   Policy Simulations 
In order to test how changes in family policy regimes would affect the length of career breaks of 
mothers, we pursue some policy reforms and apply the new rules to the Danish and Swedish 
samples. To predict the length of the career break, we replace a set of family policy covariates 
with the new ones and evaluate the survivor estimates for a “typical” case. In order to be able to 
obtain predictions, the time-dependent covariate, the rate of compensation, is changed to a time-
constant replacement rate that will only depend on the previous income, the sector of 
employment (Denmark) and the year in question (Sweden). For the Swedish case, the mandated 
parental leave period for mothers is added to the equation as an explanatory variable to be able to 
control for that in simulations. 
 
The survival probability, S(t), at time t for an individual with covariate values x can be written as 
 
S (t) = [ S0 (t) ] 
exp ( βx )          ( 2 )
 
where S0(t) is the baseline survivor function. After estimating β, we get an estimate of S0(t) by a 
non-parametric maximum likelihood method. With that estimate we generate the estimated 
survivor function for a “typical” case by substituting her characteristics and the suggested policy 
reforms in the equation (2). 
 
First, we apply the Danish system to the Swedish 2
nd child mothers’ case but we keep the entitled 
days for mothers constant (the compensation rate is set to either 1.0 for the public sector or 0.7 
for the private sector). In the second policy suggestion, we apply more equal parental leave 
schemes that share the responsibility more even between the parents and predict the effect on the 
length of the mothers’ career breaks. The parental leave quota for fathers is set to four months 
with everything else unchanged, i.e. maintaining the idea of flexibility. The third policy reform 
tests the effect of a free and perfectly available child day care. Lastly, we test the effects of 
different compensation rates, with a full pay and with a lower rate of compensation.   
 
The last row of Table 4 shows the predicted lengths of the career breaks after the suggested 
changes in family policy schemes. According to the results, mothers having their 2
nd child would 
react to these changes. When the Danish system is applied to the Swedish sample, the simulations 
indicate that women in the private sector with the low compensation rate would have a one-week 
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wage compensation as it is the case in the public sector in Denmark, Swedish women having their 
second child would take 2 weeks’ longer leave. The second policy reform gives fathers a 16-week 
long parental leave all other things unchanged (the entitlement period of mothers is left 
unchanged). This reform would decrease the career break for the mother of the type family by 4 
weeks. The result could imply that, if we tried to promote equality between males and females in 
the labor market, more leave should be directed explicitly to fathers (even without decreasing the 
entitlement period of mothers). If the idea were to encourage women to shorten the career 
breaks contingent to childbirth, i.e. work more hours, this might also result in smaller losses in 
wages and future earnings.  
 
Table 4. Results from policy simulations for a typical household. The predicted length of the career break 
under different family policy rules applied to the Swedish sample of mothers having the 2nd child.1) 
 
 








(16 weeks of 
leave for fathers) 
2ND CHILD 




rates: 1.0 / 0.5  ) 
Compensation rate  0.8  0.7 / 1.0  0.8  0.8  1.0  /  0.5 
Father’s leave (weeks)  4.0  2.0 16.0 4.0  4.0 
Max entitlement period  
for the mother (days) 
330  330 330 330 330 
Day care fee  2.5 2.0  2.5  0  2.5 
Childcare availability   0  1 0 1 0 
Duration of leave  41  40  /  43  37  39  42  /  38 
 
1) A typical household is defined as a household with a mother having average characteristic for continuous variables 
and modal values for indicator variables. Thus, the mother is 32 years old, she is married and she has another child 
aged 0-2 years. She has 7 years of labor market experience, a long university degree, and she is employed in the 
public sector (state). Her husband takes 4 weeks parental leave. The family income is  € 33’. 
 
 
The third reform involves changes in child day care availability and its price. As we saw earlier, 
we cannot test the price effect separately, because the restrictions in the supply side of the 
childcare may dominate the price effect. Free and perfectly available childcare would result in two 
weeks’ shorter parental leave periods for mothers, when the quality aspects of child day care are 
not considered. Finally, we assessed the effects of different rates of compensation. When 
mothers were given a full compensation, they would increase their leave by one week, and when 
the compensation was decreased to 0.5, they would return three weeks sooner to the labor 
market.  
 
The results from these policy reforms applied to the Danish sample are seen in Table 5. We use a 
compensation rate of 0.8 for the ‘standard person’, despite the compensation rate is typically 
either 1 (public sector) or lower than 0.8 (private sector). When applying the Swedish ‘standard 
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the case in Column 4, where we simulate the effect of free childcare and better availability of 
childcare. If the leave period for the father was extended to 16 weeks, this would reduce the 
mother’s leave period by about 2 weeks. Finally, if the ‘standard mother’s’ compensation rate was 
increased from 0.8 to full pay, this would extend the leave period by about 1 week, from 29 to 30, 
but if the compensation rate was reduced, the simulations indicate no effect on the leave period.  
 
Table 5. Results from the policy simulations for a typical household. The predicted length of a career break 
under different family policy rules applied to the Danish sample of mothers having the 2nd child.1) 
 
 








(16 weeks of 
leave for fathers) 
2ND CHILD 




rates: 1.0 / 0.5  ) 
Compensation rate  0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8  1.0    /    0.5 
Father’s leave (weeks)  2.0  4.0 16.0 2.0  2.0 
Max entitlement period  
for the mother (weeks) 
28 47 28 28 28 
Day care fee  2.0 2.5 2.0  0  2.0 
Childcare availability   1 0 1 1 1 
Duration of leave  29 29 27 29  30    /    29 
 
1) A typical household for the Danish sample: the mother is 30 years old, she is married and has another child aged 
0-2 years. She has 3 years of labor market experience, a high-school degree and she is employed in the public sector 
(municipality). Her husband takes one week of parental leave. The family income (excluded the mother’s labor 
income) is € 42’. 
 
Thus, the Swedish mothers seem to be more sensitive to these policy changes than Danish 
mothers. Especially the reactions to changes in the fathers’ leave periods differ between the two 
countries. This may reflect that for a long period, there has been much more political focus on 
shared responsibility of the parents and fathers’ take up of parental leave. Parents may tend to 
adopt the rules as norms which conduct their behavior. Further, the much more flexible structure 
of the Swedish schemes may explain the apparently larger substitution effects between Swedish 
parents, compared to Danish parents. Further, as shown in Figure 3, the compensation rate of 
Danish fathers tends to be much lower than that of Danish mothers (because a much larger 
proportion of the fathers are employed in the private sector while more than half of the mothers 
are publicly employed). We do not explicitly include the compensation rate of the fathers, and 
thus, the much lower paternal compensation rates may imply that Danish parents are to some 
extent ‘caught’ in a corner solution, where marginal changes of other policy rules have no effect 
on the behavior of the majority of the parents.      
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7 Conclusions 
This study investigates the effects of different family policy regimes on the job retention of 
Danish and Swedish mothers, controlling for other individual and family characteristics that are 
likely to affect retention. Here we focus only on mothers who had a partner and participated in 
the labor market and interrupted their careers due to childbirth during the 1990s. Our analysis 
takes advantage of the availability of comparable longitudinal data, which allow us to estimate 
parallel models across the countries. The timing of re-entry to the labor market is hypothesized to 
depend on a woman’s full wage relative to her reservation wage. The probability of ending a 
career break and resuming employment is estimated using a Cox proportional hazard model. 
 
Compared to previous research, this study applies the latest and more representative data. So far, 
only a few studies have addressed the impact of family policies on the return to work, positive 
exceptions are the studies of Rönsen & Sundström (1996) and Gustafsson et al. (1996), where 
they compare the determinants of the length of a career break in connection with childbirth 
between Sweden and some other European countries. The novelty and the contribution of this 
study are to compare the two Scandinavian countries with similar welfare state ideologies with 
high labor force participation of mothers but with different parental leave regimes. Moreover, 
here we also take the family policy regimes explicitly into account including the child day care 
availability and prices.  
 
The labor market activity of mothers in Nordic countries is among the highest in the world, and 
yet they have the most generous parental leave schemes. The parental leave regimes are based on 
the labor market attachment before childbirth and contain a job-protection. The Danish and 
Swedish family policies provide families with different kinds of incentives, which are reflected in 
labor market outcomes. The idea was to compare these two countries, which are much alike. 
They have similar cultural background, and in both countries female labor force participation 
rates are high, and particularly mothers with young children are very active in the labor market 
compared with other countries. But the rules of family policies differ. Whereas Sweden is a 
country with universal, flexible and generous parental leave schemes, Denmark represents a more 
conservative type of family policies when it comes to parental leave schemes. On the other hand, 
the coverage of publicly provided child day care is higher in Denmark and prices are slightly 
lower compared to Sweden. In Sweden, and to a smaller degree Denmark, many families have to 
queue for a place in a day care center, which makes things more difficult for families and perhaps 
cause mothers a need to decrease their hours of work. 
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To a great extent, the paid parental leave mandates determine the rate of return to employment. 
Since parental leave is longer in Sweden, the return rates are lower during the first months after 
childbirth than in Denmark. To be able to compare the re-entry rates of mothers between the 
two countries, we should keep in mind the country-specific features (e.g. other benefit systems 
and the labor market legislation) which counteract with the family policy rules. Economic factors 
have a clear effect on the decision to return from leave. A lower compensation rate prolong the 
duration of the leave period, and in areas with a good availability of childcare the higher prices of 
day care postpone it. We also find that fathers’ parental leave take-up play an important role in 
the timing of women’s employment after childbirth; the longer leaves for fathers the shorter time 
off work periods for mothers. Our findings underline the importance of the labor market 
attachment of mothers. Over 90% of mothers in both countries return to the labor market after 
childbirth.  
 
A number of policy simulations based on the estimated hazard functions for the two countries 
are performed, in order to test how much these changes would affect the mothers’ parental leave 
take-up. The policy changes include applying the Danish rules to the Swedish mothers and vice 
versa, giving fathers more ring-fenced leave, providing an access to a free childcare and varying 
the rate of compensation. For Sweden, each of these changes results in some reactions in 
mothers’ parental leave take-up for the Swedish sample, but the most interesting result is that 
when fathers were given a parental leave of 16 weeks, all other things unchanged (the entitlement 
period of mothers), the leave for the mother of the type family decreased by 4 weeks. This result 
implies that, if the political ambition is to promote equal career prospects between men and 
women, more leave should be directed explicitly to fathers.  
 
For Denmark, the substitution effects are smaller than for Sweden. We explain this empirical 
evidence by the fact that there – contrary to Sweden - has been only a very short “father quota” 
leave period (which is now abolished), on average the economic incentives are extremely negative 
for the fathers, and thus there is yet no tradition in Denmark for the families to consider 
potential substitution options between the time of the parents.   
 
Thus, this paper provides some evidence that if the political ambition is to promote the labor 
supply of women and to promote a more equal role sharing between mothers and fathers, an 
active family policy may help to achieve these goals.   
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Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the sample of parents, the Swedish (1993-1998) and the Danish (1993-
1996), where the mother gives birth to her first child. All variables related to the market work are records 
















         
AGE  29.2 33.4    27.9 30.4 
AGE WHEN HAVING THE FIRST CHILD  29.2 30.9    27.9 30.4 
         
HAVING CHILDREN 0-2 YEARS OF AGE  0 0.00    0  0 
HAVING CHILDREN 3-6 YEARS OF AGE  0 0.01    0  0 
         
NUMBER OF CHILDREN  1.0 1.09    1.0  1.0 
         
MARRIED  0.94     0.31  0.33 
         
EDUCATION (the highest attained level)         
     ELEMENTARY SCHOOL  0.05 0.11    0.18 0.19 
     HIGH-SCHOOL DEGREE  0.47 0.44    0.53 0.57 
     BACHELOR’S DEGREE  0.24 0.22    0.24 0.16 
     MASTER’S DEGREE (or higher)  0.24 0.23    0.05 0.08 
         
HOURS OF WORK *) 1 788.4  2007.1    1 425.4  1 751.8 
SHARE WITH FULL-TIME WORK *) 0.90 0.93    0.95 n.a. 
HOURLY WAGE RATE (€) *) 10.9 12.9    17.0 20.0 
LABOR INCOME (€ 10 000) *) 1.85 2.23    2.34 2.98 
YEARS OF WORK EXPERIENCE  7.4 11.5    6.3  9.4 
FAMILY INCOME (€ 10 000)  3.40     3.54  
         
SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT         
     STATE  0.11 0.14    0.06 0.06 
     MUNICIPALITY  0.38 0.13    0.34 0.06 
     PRIVATE  0.48 0.67    0.59 0.86 
     OTHER  0.03 0.06    0.01 0.02 
         
LIVING IN A BIG CITY **) 0.48 0.48    0.20 0.19 
         
PARENTAL LEAVE         
     TAKE-UP OF LEAVE (weeks)  40.2 4.4    30.6 1.3 
     SHARE OF THE FATHERS HAVING LEAVE   77.3     59.0 
         
DAY CARE FEE (€)  232.0     207.1  
         
COMPENSATION RATE 1 ***) 0.83 0.78    0.78 0.55 
COMPENSATION RATE2  0.79 0.75    0.49 0.37 
COMPENSATION RATE3  0.14 0.17      
         
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  3 300  3 300    3675  3435 
*) For Sweden, the information on hours of work and hourly wage rates are not available for every individual but for 
about 1/3 of our sample, therefore the mean values are calculated only for those having this information. 
For Denmark, the mean values are calculated excluding the self-employed.  
**) For Sweden, Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö areas. For Denmark, Copenhagen, Frederiksberg and Aarhus.  
***) For Sweden, the rate of compensation changes during the parental leave (time-varying variable) and varies 
across sector of occupation (with an income ceiling), and there have also been changes in the parental leave 
compensation rules over the years. For Denmark, the rate of compensation varies across sector of occupation, and 
further there is an income ceiling for compensation. 
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1996), where the mother gives birth to her second child. All variables related to the market work are records 
















          
AGE 30.4  33.1    30.5  32.8 
AGE WHEN HAVING THE FIRST CHILD  27.8  28.8    26.5  n.a. 
          
HAVING CHILDREN 0-2 YEARS OF AGE  0.25  0.24    0.55  0.56 
HAVING CHILDREN 3-6 YEARS OF AGE  0.64  0.64    0.36  0.35 
          
NUMBER OF CHILDREN  2.00  1.89    2.00  2.00 
          
MARRIED 0.56      0.59   
          
EDUCATION (the highest attained level)           
     ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 0.07  0.13    0.19  0.19 
     HIGH-SCHOOL DEGREE  0.57  0.55    0.51  0.56 
     BACHELOR’S DEGREE 0.20  0.16    0.26  0.16 
     MASTER’S DEGREE (or higher)  0.16  0.16    0.04  0.09 
          
HOURS OF WORK*) 1 378.1  1 921.9    1 381.0  1 804.8 
SHARE WITH FULL-TIME WORK*) 0.81 0.92   0.96  n.a. 
HOURLY WAGE RATE (€) *) 10.8 13.1   17.0  21.5 
LABOR INCOME (€ 10 000) *) 1.35 2.16   2.29  3.27 
YEARS OF WORK EXPERIENCE 8.2  13.1    8.1  11.7 
FAMILY INCOME  (€ 10 000)  3.46      4.06   
          
SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT           
     STATE  0.09  0.12    0.05  0.07 
     MUNICIPALITY  0.43  0.12    0.42  0.07 
     PRIVATE  0.42  0.68    0.51  0.84 
     OTHER  0.06  0.08    0.02  0.02 
          
LIVING IN A BIG CITY **) 0.39 0.39   0.12  0.12 
          
PARENTAL LEAVE           
     TAKE-UP OF LEAVE (weeks)  42.5  3.8    31.4  1.27 
     SHARE OF THE FATHERS HAVING 
LEAVE 
 69.0     58.8 
          
DAY CARE FEE (€) 230.0      206.8   
          
COMPENSATION RATE 1 ***) 0.84 0.79   0.80  0.53 
COMPENSATION RATE2  0.81 0.76   0.48  0.35 
COMPENSATION RATE3  0.17  0.17       
          
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  9 756  9 756    3172  3 048 
Notes: See Table A1 
 
 
  37Table A3. Descriptive statistics of the sample of parents, the Swedish (1993-1998) and the Danish (1993-
1996), where the mother gives birth to her third or higher order child. All variables related to the market 
















          
AGE 33.2  35.9    33.2  35.3 
AGE WHEN HAVING THE FIRST CHILD  25.4  27.6    24.3  n.a. 
          
HAVING CHILDREN 0-2 YEARS OF AGE  0.14  0.13    0.38  0.39 
HAVING CHILDREN 3-6 YEARS OF AGE  0.66  0.80    0.71  0.72 
          
NUMBER OF CHILDREN  3.37  3.17    3.20  3.18 
          
MARRIED 0.75      0.70   
          
EDUCATION (the highest attained level)           
     ELEMENTARY SCHOOL 0.14  0.20    0.26  0.23 
     HIGH-SCHOOL DEGREE  0.55  0.52    0.39  0.51 
     BACHELOR’S DEGREE 0.18  0.13    0.31  0.17 
     MASTER’S DEGREE (or higher)  0.14  0.15    0.04  0.09 
          
HOURS OF WORK*) 1 386.2  1 958.0    1 329.4  1 741.1 
SHARE WITH FULL-TIME WORK*) 0.77 0.92    0.93  n.a. 
HOURLY WAGE RATE (€) *) 10.8 13.3    17.0  21.1 
LABOR INCOME (€ 10 000) *) 1.29 2.12    2.19  3.21 
YEARS OF WORK EXPERIENCE 9.2  15.7    9.0  12.9 
FAMILY INCOME (€ 10 000)  3.83      4.16   
          
SECTOR OF EMPLOYMENT           
     STATE  0.07  0.12    0.05  0.06 
     MUNICIPALITY  0.53  0.15    0.52  0.10 
     PRIVATE  0.32  0.63    0.38  0.83 
     OTHER  0.08  0.10    0.05  0.01 
          
LIVING IN A BIG CITY **) 0.34 0.34    0.09  0.09 
          
PARENTAL LEAVE           
     TAKE-UP OF LEAVE (weeks)  43.1  4.0    32.5  1.2 
     SHARE OF THE FATHERS HAVING 
LEAVE 
 72.5      58.2 
          
DAY CARE FEE (€) 229.0      205.2   
          
COMPENSATION RATE 1 ***) 0.84 0.79    0.85  0.54 
COMPENSATION RATE2  0.81 0.76    0.49  0.34 
COMPENSATION RATE3  0.17  0.17       
          
NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS  7 517  7 517    1 270  1 197 
Notes: See Table A1 
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